Inflation, Tax Rules, and Capital Formation by Martin Feldstein
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National
Bureau of Economic Research
Volume Title: Inflation, Tax Rules, and Capital Formation
Volume Author/Editor: Martin Feldstein




Chapter Title: A Summary of the Theoretical Models
Chapter Author: Martin Feldstein
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c11327
Chapter pages in book: (p. 17 - 27)A Summary of
the Theoretical Models
This chapter summarizes four rather abstract models of a very simple
economy with a constant and known rate of inflation. These models,
persented in chapters 3 through 6, examine what happens to asset yields
and capital intensity when the rate of inflation changes from one "perma-
nent" level to another. Within this framework, it is possible to examine
the implications of different tax rules, especially different forms of index-
ing and of inflation nonneutrality. These theoretical models represent my
own attempt to understand how inflation and the tax system interact to
influence the rate of capital formation.
The first of these theoretical studies, reported in "Inflation, Income
Tax Rules, and the Rate of Interest" (chap. 3) introduces a corporate tax
and a personal tax on investment income into a simple neoclassical
monetary growth model. The model is then used to study the effect of
inflation on the rate of interest and on the capital intensity of the econ-
omy. Except for the capital income taxes, this model is very similar to the
one developed by James Tobin (1965).
Tobin obtained his famous conclusion that inflation increases capital
intensity by analyzing an economy in which all taxes were assumed to be
of a lump sum variety. The capital-increasing effect of inflation is also a
possible special case in my own more general analysis. But the richer
description of the tax system shows that the tax rates and saving behavior
together determine whether an increase in the rate of inflation will
increase or decrease the steady-state capital intensity of the economy. In
this more general model and with plausible parameter values, the most
likely effect of an increase in the rate of inflation is a fall in the real net
The main part of this chapter appeared previously in my Two Lectures on Macroeco-
nomics, in 1980 Woodward Lectures at the University of British Columbia, published by the
University of British Columbia, 1982.
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rate of interest received by savers and therefore a decrease in the capital
intensity of production in the economy.
The model that leads to this conclusion involves two important sim-
plifying assumptions. First, all corporate investment is financed by debt;
equivalently, and perhaps more plausibly, only debt finance is used at the
margin so that the corporate income tax produces revenue for the govern-
ment because it taxes the intramarginal equity income.
1 The second
assumption is that firms use a correct measure of economic depreciation
in calculating taxable profits; in particular, inflation does not reduce the
value of depreciation allowances. Both of these assumptions are replaced
by more realistic descriptions of corporate finance and historic cost
depreciation in subsequent papers that are described below. Although
these more general analyses give results that more accurately reflect
reality, analysis of the present model with debt-only finance and with
economic depreciation is useful for highlighting some important features
of the general mechanism by which inflation affects capital intensity and
asset yields.
In this model, the effect of inflation on capital intensity depends on two
countervailing forces. First, there is the liquidity or portfolio composition
effect emphasized by Tobin (1965) and Mundell (1963). An increase in
the rate of inflation raises the nominal interest rate, implying a higher cost
of holding money balances. This induces a shift in portfolio composition
from money to real capital. The portfolio composition effect in this
two-asset model unequivocally implies that inflation raises capital inten-
sity. This effect was the basis of Tobin's conclusion.
There is, however, a second effect of inflation that depends on the
nature of the tax system and of saving behavior. Because the tax system is
based on nominal interest payments and receipts rather than real interest
payments and receipts, inflation is likely to alter the real net rate of
interest received by savers. If saving is sensitive to the rate of return,
inflation will alter the saving rate and therefore the long-run capital
intensity of production. Although a positive relationship between the real
net rate of return and the saving rate is not an unambiguous implication of
economic theory,
2 it appears to be supported by empirical research and
by the examination of plausible parameter values in theoretical models;
3
unless I say otherwise, I shall therefore be assuming in this chapter that a
higher real net rate of return increases the saving rate or at least does not
decrease it. I might add that only the first of the three theoretical models
that I will describe assumes a variable saving rate; in the others, indi-
viduals save a fixed fraction of disposable income.
1. See Joseph Stiglitz (1973) for a model that incorporates this assumption of marginal
debt finance.
2. This is time even for compensated changes in the rate of return; see Feldstein (1978c).
3. See Boskin (1978), Feldstein (1981a), Feldstein and Tsiang (1968), and Summers
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The effect of inflation on the real net rate of interest depends on the
entire tax structure. It is easy but wrong to fall into the trap of arguing as
follows: "Since inflation raises the interest rate by the rate of inflation,
and the inflation premium is subject to tax, the net interest rate rises by
less than the rate of inflation and the real net interest rate therefore falls.
For example, if an economy has a 4 percent interest rate with no inflation,
an 8 percent inflation will raise the interest rate to 12 percent. With a 50
percent personal tax rate, the original 4 percent interest rate would leave
a net yield of 2 percent; the 12 percent rate would leave a net yield of only
6 percent or 2 percent less than the rate of inflation. Thus the real net rate
falls from a positive 2 percent to a negative 2 percent."
This argument is wrong in assuming that the interest rate necessarily
rises by the rate of inflation. This famous theoretical proposition of Irving
Fisher (1930) was based on an economy with no taxes. When borrowers
can deduct their interest costs, they can afford to pay a higher inflation
premium. More specifically, with economic depreciation and no other
adverse effects of inflation on real profitability, the borrower can afford
to raise the interest rate that it pays until the inflation rate equals the rise
in the interest rate net of the borrower's tax deduction. Thus, if the
borrower is in the 50 percent tax bracket, the interest rate will rise by two
percentage points for every percentage point of inflation. In the numeri-
cal example that I considered in the previous paragraph, an 8 percent rate
of inflation would raise the interest rate by 16 percentage points to 20
percent. The net interest rate to the lender in the 50 percent bracket is
thus 10 percent and the net real rate becomes 2 percent, exactly what it
was in the absence of inflation.
This example illustrates a general proposition that is shown more
formally in the paper: The real net rate of return to savers will remain
unchanged if and only if the tax rates paid by borrowers and lenders are
equal. If the tax rate of borrowers exceeds that of lenders, the real net
return to lenders will rise and saving will be encouraged. Conversely, if
the tax rate of lenders is higher than that of borrowers, the real net return
to lenders will fall and saving will be discouraged. The net effect of
inflation on capital intensity in this case depends on the relative strength
of the saving effect and the portfolio composition effect. Some calcula-
tions in the paper itself show that the relative size of the relevant money
balances is so small that even a quite small sensitivity of saving to the net
rate of interest will cause the saving effect to be more important than the
portfolio composition effect.
The relation between the two tax rates and the real net rate of return
can be derived explicitly by noting that, with all debt finance and eco-
nomic depreciation, the real return on capital net of the corporate income
tax [(1 — T)/' where T is the corporate tax rate and /' is the marginal
product of capital] must equal the real net cost per dollar of borrowed20 Inflation and Tax Rules in Macroeconomic Equilibrium
funds [(1 - j)i - TT where / is the nominal interest rate and TT is the rate of
inflation]. Thus,
(1) (1-T)/' = (l-T)i-ir
or
(2) I=/' + W(1-T)
The net rate of interest to the saver is iN = (1 — 6)/ or
(3) ^=(1-6)!^
1 — T
The real net rate of interest to the saver is rN - iN - TT or
(4) rN=(i-e)/'^ — T
Thus the real net rate of return to the saver rises or falls with inflation
according to whether or not the borrowers' tax rate exceeds the lenders'
tax rate.
These calculations highlight the importance of the deductability of
nominal payments by borrowers and the taxation of nominal payments
received by savers. While this emphasis is useful, it implies too strong a
condition for inflation to depress capital intensity. A more general model
shows that inflation can reduce capital intensity even when the borrowers'
rate exceeds the lenders' rate if we also recognize the historical cost
method of depreciation, the tax treatment of inventory accounting
profits, and the taxation of capital gains. I will return to these more
general conclusions later in this chapter.
But first, the implied impact of inflation on the interest rate in the first
model deserves further comment. Equation (2) implies that di/dir = 1/(1
— T) or approximately 2 and not the point-for-point relation between
changes in inflation and in the interest rate that was predicted by Irving
Fisher for a taxless economy and that has in fact been observed at least
approximately in the United States in recent years. The difference be-
tween the pure inflation effect implied by the model and indicated by
equation (2) and the actual one-for-one movements that have been
experienced reflects four features of the U.S. economy that the present
model ignores: (1) the additional tax burdens caused by inflation because
of historic cost depreciation and inventory accounting rules; (2) the role
of equity financing and the taxation of the return to equity; (3) the
presence of government debt and debt management policies; and (4) the
presence of other debt instruments that are not affected by inflation in the
same way as the corporate bond market but that are close substitutes for
corporate bonds in investors' portfolios (i.e., residential mortgages, state
and local bonds, foreign bonds). A richer model that incorporates these21 A Summary of the Theoretical Models
features has implications that are consistent with the observed behavior
of interest rates. The simpler model is nevertheless useful in focusing on
the partial effect of nominal interest deductibility and taxation.
Despite its simple structure, or perhaps because of it, the current
model also provides insights into the welfare effects of inflation. The
economists' traditional objection to a positive constant rate of inflation is
that it imposes an efficiency loss by distorting the demand for money
balances.
4 This traditional conclusion refers to an economy with no
distorting taxes. Phelps (1972) has stressed that the increase in the money
supply that causes inflation is also a source of government revenue that in
itself permits a reduction in the tax rate that distorts labor supply. Phelps
concluded from this observation that the optimal inflation rate is positive
and may even be substantial. The appropriate analysis is more complex
when we recognize the nonneutrality of existing taxes on capital income.
5
Even in the absence of inflation, the net return to savers (rN) is less than
the marginal product of capital (by the rate of personal income tax: rN =
(1 - 6)/') and this distortion between the gross and net rates of return is
itself a welfare loss. A positive rate of inflation affects the tax wedge
between the marginal product of capital and the net return as well as the
amount of revenue that the government collects at existing tax rates (and
therefore its ability to reduce—or its need to increase—the distortionary
tax on labor income). The effects of inflation on the "investment tax
wedge" and on revenue are of opposite signs. If the lenders' tax rate
exceeds the borrowers', inflation increases tax revenues but worsens the
tax wedge between the marginal product of capital and the net return;
conversely, if the borrowers' tax rate is higher, inflation reduces tax
revenue but improves (i.e., reduces) the distorting wedge between the
gross and net rates of return. Determining the optimal steady-state rate
of inflation requires balancing at least three effects of inflation on eco-
nomic welfare: (1) the welfare loss that results from reduced liquidity, (2)
the change in welfare that results from the increase or decrease in the
differential between the marginal product of capital and each individual's
marginal rate of substitution, and (3) the change in other distorting taxes
that results from the increase or decrease in the net tax revenue in
response to inflation.
Although the analysis is necessarily more complex in richer models, the
same conflict between the investment tax wedge and the revenue effect
remains. With parameter values that provide a realistic description of the
4. See Bailey (1956), Friedman (1969), and Feldstein (1979).
5. Indeed, even within his own more limited framework, Phelps's conclusion is not
correct. Recall that Friedman has shown that, ignoring the revenue effect of inflation, the
optimal rate of inflation is not zero but is negative and equal to the marginal product of
capital. The force of Phelps's argument is only that, when the revenue effect is considered,
the optimal tax rate should be greater than this negative number and not that it should be
positive.22 Inflation and Tax Rules in Macroeconomic Equilibrium
U.S. economy, inflation does raise extra tax revenue (that could be used
to reduce the distortionary tax on labor income) but accomplishes this
only by increasing the distortionary wedge between the net return to
savers and the pretax marginal product of capital. Since the existing mix
of labor and capital income taxes places too heavy a relative tax on capital
income even in the absence of inflation (i.e., the welfare loss of collecting
the existing amount of total tax revenue could be reduced by switching
more of the tax to labor) ,
6 the effect of inflation on the relative rates of tax
on capital and labor is undesirable.
As I have emphasized several times, two important limitations in the
realism of this first model are (1) the exclusive focus on debt finance and
(2) the assumption that firms are allowed economic depreciation. Drop-
ping these restrictions has important implications for the effects of infla-
tion on the equilibrium of the economy. Jerry Green, Eytan Sheshinski
and I extended this first model (in "Inflation and Taxes in a Growing
Economy with Debt and Equity Finance," presented in chapter 4) to
recognize that firms finance investment by both debt and equity (in a ratio
that depends on tax rates and on the rate of inflation) and that the
"historic cost" method of depreciation causes the effective tax rate on
corporate income to rise with the rate of inflation. A complete analysis of
such a model would follow the procedure of the first model and trace out
the full general equilibrium effects that a change in the permanent rate of
inflation would have on the asset yields, portfolio composition, the real
rate of return, and the capital stock. We followed a simpler and more
partial analysis. We took both the saving rate and the ratio of real money
balances to real capital as fixed. This implies that the capital stock and the
pretax marginal product of capital remain fixed when the inflation rate
changes. In this framework we examined how a change in the rate of
inflation alters the yields on debt and equity. It is easy to see how this
could then be extended to allow for the general equilibrium effects of
changes in the saving rate, portfolio composition, and capital intensity.
The analysis in this new paper showed that the historic cost method of
depreciation has important effects on the yields of both debt and equity.
Because depreciation for tax purposes is limited to the original or "his-
toric" cost of the firm's capital stock, a higher rate of inflation reduces the
real value of the depreciation allowance and thereby raises the real tax
burden on corporate income. This extra real tax reduces the net return
that firms can pay to the suppliers of debt and equity capital. This
reduction in the real net return to capital is divided between debt and
equity in a way that depends on the substitutability between debt and
equity in the portfolios of individual investors. In general, inflation
reduces both the real net return to equity and the real net rate of interest.
6. See Feldstein (1978a).23 A Summary of the Theoretical Models
Understanding the role of historic cost depreciation helps to resolve
the puzzling and counterfactual implication of the simpler model that the
nominal interest rate rises by approximately twice the increase in the rate
of inflation. Put simply, historic cost depreciation reduces the firm's
ability to pay such high interest rates. With a constant marginal product
of capital (/') and a constant debt to equity ratio, the relation between
the interest rate and the rate of inflation can be written di/dir = (1 —
8)/(l — T) where 8 is the extra tax per 100 units of capital that is collected
when the inflation rate rises by one percentage point. Thus, if a 10 percent
inflation rate and historical cost depreciation together mean that the tax
rate on capital rises by five percentage points, 8 = 0.5 and dildTt = .5/(1
— T) or approximately one. More generally, the effect of inflation on the
nominal interest rate depends on the relative magnitudes of the historical
cost depreciation penalty (8) and the benefits of deducting nominal
interest rates (as measured by the corporate tax rate, T). The analysis in
our article is based on an approximation that 8 is approximately 0.2,
implying that the interest rate rises by significantly more than the inflation
rate but that calculation still ignored the inventory accounting penalty,
government debt management, and other financial assets.
The effect of inflation on the real net return to savers can be summa-
rized by a simple expression if we limit attention to the special case in
which investors wish to hold debt and equity in fixed proportions. With
this assumption, it is not necessary to worry about changes in risk premia
that would otherwise influence the interest rate and the yield on equities.




The first term reflects the effects of basing taxes on nominal interest
payments and expenses. The real net return to the saver rises or falls with
inflation according to the relative tax rates on borrowers and lenders for
the reasons that have been discussed above; this part of equation (5) is the
same as the previous equation (4). The second term reflects the adverse
effect of historical cost depreciation on the net return on debt. Note that 6
2* T is a sufficient (although not necessary) condition for inflation to
reduce the real net return on debt.
The comparable effect on equity can also be calculated most easily
if we assume that the debt equity ratio is constant. The Feld-
stein-Green-Sheshinski analysis then shows that:
(6) ^=-[c + 8(l-9)]
where eN is the real net of tax return per unit of equity and c is the effective24 Inflation and Tax Rules in Macroeconomic Equilibrium
rate of capital gains tax. This is unambiguously negative. Note that the
assumption that the debt-equity ratio is fixed implies that the gap be-
tween the real net yields on debt and on equity varies with inflation.
In general, inflation will also influence the firm's debt-equity.ratios.
Although the nature of this dependence is complex, in the simple case in
which the only nonneutrality in the tax system is in the treatment of
interest (i.e., when there is economic depreciation and no taxation of
nominal capital gains), inflation raises the debt-equity ratio in the econ-
omy if the borrowers' tax rate exceeds the lenders' tax rate (T > 9) and
reduces it if the borrowing rate is lower. It is easy to see why this is so since
the higher tax rate for borrowers means that the government loses money
to investors on every dollar of debt, therefore encouraging the substitu-
tion of debt for equity.
In this paper, Green, Sheshinski and I also examined the effects of
alternative indexing rules. It is clear from equation (6) that indexing
depreciation and capital gains (8 = c = 0) would make the real net return
to equity independent of the inflation rate as long as the debt-equity ratio
remained unchanged. With economic depreciation (8 = 0), the real net
rate of interest is affected only by the difference between the tax rates on
borrowers and lenders (equation 5). In the special case of equal tax rates,
there is no need to adjust the tax treatment of interest payments and
receipts in order to keep both the real net yield on both debt and equity
unaffected by inflation. Indeed, even if the debt equity ratio is not fixed,
the analysis in the paper shows that the net yields are unaffected by
inflation if there is economic depreciation, no taxation of nominal capital
gains, and equality of tax rates on borrowers and lenders. (Of course, the
complete neutrality is true only if everyone has the same rate and not just
if the average rate among borrowers equals the average rate among
lenders. Even if the averages are equal, the individuals with the highest
marginal tax rates will lose and those with the lowest marginal tax rates
will gain.)
Illustrative but plausible parameter values suggested to Green, She-
shinski, and me that "With our current tax system, inflation decreases the
net rate of return and therefore is likely to decrease the rate of saving.
This in turn would decrease the ratio of capital to labor and thus increase
the marginal product of capital. This in turn would partially offset the fall
in the after-tax rate of return, but the qualitative results of our analysis
would remain unchanged."
A theoretical model cannot be a complete picture of reality and still be
simple enough to be analytically useful. Examining different models that
emphasize different aspects of a problem can, however, provide useful
insights about the complex reality that is of ultimate interest. In this
spirit, the third paper ("Fiscal Policies, Inflation, and Capital Forma-
tion," chap. 5) explores another facet of the general subject of the25 A Summary of the Theoretical Models
interrelationship between inflation, fiscal policy, and capital formation:
the role of government bonds and monetary (or debt-management)
policy. More specifically, the monetary growth model with which I began
in the first model is extended by recognizing that the government can
finance its deficit by alternative combinations of money and bonds. The
monetary policy that is selected (i.e., the combination of money and
bonds) determines the extent to which a government deficit causes infla-
tion, crowds out private investment, or both. The analysis emphasizes
that the impact of any monetary policy depends crucially on the structure
of the tax rules.
The importance of government bonds in this model of the economy is
that they provide an alternative asset which, unlike money, has a nominal
yield that can vary with the rate of inflation and into which individuals can
channel their saving instead of acquiring claims to physical capital. This
rechannelling of saving represents an important way in which inflation
can reduce real capital accumulation even if the saving rate itself is not
sensitive to the real rate of return. The availability of government bonds
is thus a reason why, contrary to Tobin's earlier conclusion, a higher rate
of inflation may not succeed in increasing investors' willingness to hold
real capital and may have just the opposite effect.
The existence of both government bonds and money also provides a
further way of explaining the observation that the real pretax interest rate
has remained constant. The puzzling implication of the models that I
have already described (i.e., that inflation would raise the real pretax
interest rate) reflected the absence of any monetary or debt-management
policy. The current analysis shows how the government can reduce the
real yield on bonds by decreasing the ratio of government bonds to
money. The government, in other words, can validate Irving Fisher's
propositions by a relative increase in the money supply.
A surprising result of the formal analysis of this model is that the real
per capita government deficit can increase permanently without inducing
any changes in either inflation or capital intensity. This will happen,
however, in a fully employed economy only if there is a corresponding
reduction in the share of government spending in national income. In
contrast, if the government's share of national income is constant, a
permanent increase in the real per capita deficit must be accompanied by
an increase in the rate of inflation, or by a decrease in equilibrium capital
intensity, or both.
With the existing tax system and the type of monetary policy that has
been pursued in the United States, an increase in the deficit is likely to
cause both a higher rate of inflation and a reduced capital intensity of
production. More specifically, this is the likely implication of a monetary
policy that keeps the real interest rate on government debt constant by
adjusting the mix of bonds and money when the size of the deficit26 Inflation and Tax Rules in Macroeconomic Equilibrium
changes. The basic reason for this is that an increase in inflation reduces
the real net yield on private capital because of historic cost depreciation
and other tax accounting rules. If the real net yield on government bonds
is maintained while the real net yield on private capital falls, there will be
incentive for individuals to switch from real investment to the holding of
government debt. Capital intensity will fall except in the unlikely event
that the adverse effect of inflation on the demand for money outweighs
the positive effect of inflation on the demand for bonds. The greater
responsiveness of bond demand than of money demand is quite likely in
view of the relative magnitudes of both types of assets and the greater
substitutability between debt and capital than between money and
capital.
The formal analysis in this paper also shows that the reduced capital
intensity in this case is accompanied by an increased rate of inflation. To
prevent such an increase in the rate of inflation would require a greater
rise in the interest rate, enough to cause the demand for government
liabilities (i.e., the sum of bonds and money) to increase enough to
absorb an increased deficit without a higher proportional rate of growth
of either money or bonds. To state this same point in a slightly different
way, the faster growth of government liabilities can be absorbed without
increasing the proportional growth of either money or bonds (and there-
fore the inflation rate) if the levels of money and bonds that are demanded
(i.e., the denominators of the proportional growth rates) are increased.
The higher interest rate would make this possible by increasing the
demand for bonds by more than it decreases the demand for money.
Although such a policy would prevent inflation, the government deficit
would reduce real capital accumulation. The analysis makes it clear that a
higher rate of real capital accumulation can only be achieved by either a
reduction in the government deficit or an increase in private saving. If
private saving is responsive to a higher real yield, the policy of high
interest rates and the prevention of inflation can together increase private
saving. Other specific fiscal incentives that reduce the wedge between the
marginal product of capital and the real after-tax return might also be
used to increase the rate of saving. In this context, a reduction in the
subsidy for spending on consumer durables, housing, and other forms of
what we might call "consumption capital" would also encourage the
accumulation of more plant and equipment.
An explicit analysis of the effect of inflation on the equilibrium demand
for housing capital is presented in chapter 6, "Inflation, Tax Rules, and
the Accumulation of Residential and Nonresidential Capital." The es-
sential framework is a monetary growth model with taxation of nominal
corporate and household income. The model of chapters 3 and 4 is
extended to include both a general goods sector and an owner-occupied
housing sector. To facilitate this analysis, the earlier models are sim-27 A Summary of the Theoretical Models
plified by assuming that both savings and money demand are inelastic and
that all investment is financed by debt.
Within this framework, the analysis shows that an increase in the rate
of inflation raises the amount of housing stock per person and reduces the
amount of plant and equipment. It is clear from the structure of the
analysis that the same conclusion would hold in a model with all equity
finance. If the saving rate is an increasing function of the real net-of-tax
return, the total of both types of capital would be reduced but the change
in the mix in favor of housing would remain. The basic reason for all of
these effects is the adverse impact of historic cost accounting on the
profitability of the corporate capital relative to the implicit return on
housing capital.
This brings me back to the point with which I began this chapter. It is
now time to turn to the four theoretical studies themselves and then to the
empirical research presented in later chapters that they led me to—
research on the impact of inflation on effective rates of tax as well as
research on the effects of inflation on the real yields on corporate debt
and equity as well as research on the effect that the interaction of inflation
and our tax rules has had on private saving and on business fixed invest-
ment. I hope, however, that even this brief review of the four simplified
models indicates the types of theoretical thinking that helped me to
clarify my own analysis about the nature of the interaction between
inflation, taxes, and capital formation.